Not only do I not know what I believe, but also I cannot know for sure that I believe. How can I define precisely what my attitude is toward something it cannot conceivably grasp? Can I be said to be in the relation of “belief,” in any usual sense of that term, toward something that I cheerfully and readily acknowledge to be absolutely incomprehensible to me?(…) No man can be sure that he is in faith; and we can say of no man with certainty that he has or does not have faith. (…)Not only does faith always carry its opposite uncertainty within itself, but also this faith is never a static condition that is -had-, but a movement toward… And toward what? In the nature of the case we cannot state this “what.” We cannot make a flat assertion about our faith like a simple assertion that we have blue eyes or are six feet tall. More than this, the affirmation of our faith can never be made in the simple indicative mood at all. The statement “I believe” can only be uttered as a prayer.
Not only do I not know what I believe, but also I cannot know for sure that I believe. How can I define precisely what my attitude is toward something it cannot conceivably grasp? Can I be said to be in the relation of “belief,” in any usual sense of that term, toward something that I cheerfully and readily acknowledge to be absolutely incomprehensible to me?(…) No man can be sure that he is in faith; and we can say of no man with certainty that he has or does not have faith. (…)Not only does faith always carry its opposite uncertainty within itself, but also this faith is never a static condition that is -had-, but a movement toward… And toward what? In the nature of the case we cannot state this “what.” We cannot make a flat assertion about our faith like a simple assertion that we have blue eyes or are six feet tall. More than this, the affirmation of our faith can never be made in the simple indicative mood at all. The statement “I believe” can only be uttered as a prayer.